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Abstract.  The present article aims to highlight the effects of trust on safety performance 
in high-reliability organizations (HROs) like nuclear power plants, chemical plants or 
hospital emergency departments. The author claims that not only beneficial but also 
detrimental effects have to be considered in the analysis of trust within these socio-technical 
systems. Potential safety outcomes of trusting behavior are discussed in the light of two types 
of interaction underlying task management in HROs: trust in human interactions vs. trust 
in human–system interaction. Trust is further specified according to the constraints and 
requirements that may interfere with the beneficial role of trusting behavior. In particular, 
three distinct types of trust beliefs moderating the effect of trust on safety performance are 
addressed: beliefs based on shared values and norms, institution-based beliefs, and beliefs 
based on system reliability. Finally, the author highlights organizational factors that 
emerge as crucial for the development and maintenance of safe work settings in which the 
beneficial aspects of trust are brought to bear.
Key words.  High-reliability organizations – Human interaction – Institutions –- Redundancy – 
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Résumé.  Cet article vise à mettre en lumière les effets de la confiance sur les performances en 
termes de fiabilité dans les Organisations à Haute Fiabilité (OHF) comme les centrales 
nucléaires, les usines chimiques ou les services d’urgence des hôpitaux. L’auteur affirme que 
dans l’analyse de la confiance dans le cadre de ces systèmes socio-techniques, il convient de 
considérer non seulement les effets bénéfiques mais aussi négatifs de la confiance en termes de 
fiabilité. Les effets qui résultent potentiellement d’un comportement de confiance sont discutés 
dans le cadre de deux types d’interaction dans la gestion des tâches dans les organisations à 
haute fiabilité: l’interaction humaine vs l’interaction homme–machine. La confiance est ensuite 
316  Social Science Information Vol 48 – no 2
rapportée aux contraintes et aux exigences susceptibles d’interférer avec les effets bénéfiques du 
comportement de confiance. En particulier, l’auteur s’interroge sur trois types de croyances qui 
modulent l’effet de la confiance sur les performances en termes de sécurité: les croyances basées sur 
des valeurs et des normes communes, les croyances basées sur l’institution et les croyances basées 
sur la fiabilité du système. Finalement, l’auteur met en lumière les facteurs organisationnels 
qui se révèlent essentiels pour le développement et le maintien d’environnements de travail sûrs 
dans lesquels les aspects bénéfiques de la confiance peuvent s’exprimer.
Mots-clés.  Confiance – Institutions – Interaction – Organisations à haute fiabilité – 
Redondance – Sécurité des systèmes
The aim of this article is to illuminate the role of trust in a specific type of 
organization, namely high-reliability organizations (HROs), like nuclear power 
plants, chemical plants or hospital emergency departments. In such organiza-
tions intrinsic hazards are always present. Multiple personnel with varied 
expertise work together in units and teams guided by systems, structures and 
procedures conducive to safety and reliability. Although the definitions of 
HROs in recent literature differ to a fair degree (e.g. Marais, Dulac & Levenson, 
2004), I use the term HRO to generally refer to organizations that actively man-
age to control the risks of technical operations and depend on maintaining high 
levels of performance reliability and safety (Rochlin, 1993).
Literature from a diversity of disciplines highlights that trusting behavior 
significantly improves organizational effectiveness, for instance cooperation 
and communication (e.g. Dirks & Ferrin, 2001), adaptive organizational 
forms like network relations (Miles & Snow, 1992; McEvily, Perrone & 
Zaheer, 2003), resource exchange between units (Tsai & Goshal, 1998) and 
managerial promotion of empowerment (Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 1996). 
Accordingly the concept of trust has started to emerge as an important topic 
in HRO research. For instance, empirical studies suggest trust to be an impor-
tant mediator for the influence of leadership on safety performance (e.g. 
Donald & Young, 1996; Zohar, 2002; Clarke & Ward, 2006). The more lead-
ers promote trust from their workers, by inspirational appeals for instance, 
the more workers reciprocate and increase their commitment to safety, by 
actively participating in safety campaigns and so forth. Reason (1998) dis-
cusses the role of trust in reporting systems within HROs where workers are 
requested to report errors and near misses for the sake of organizational 
learning. Specifically, the success of such feedback functions crucially 
depends on how workers trust they will receive fair treatment from the man-
agement and their work mates. Moreover, trust is a central component in 
models of safety culture, which implies that behavioral norms, shared 
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assumptions and values of organizational members constitute a major 
source of system safety (e.g. Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; INSAG-15, 1998). 
In contrast, low trust relations between key stakeholders are assumed to have 
a negative impact on safety culture by reinforcing blame and fostering non-
reporting of safety-relevant information (Cox, Jones & Collinson, 2006).
On the other hand, it has recently been proposed that trust may have det-
rimental effects on safety performance (e.g. Jeffcott et al., 2006; Conchie & 
Donald, 2008). Therefore in a special issue on ‘Trust in high-risk work con-
texts’, published in Risk analysis, Conchie, Donald & Taylor end their edito-
rial on ‘Trust: the missing piece in the safety puzzle’ with a more cautious 
evaluation of the concept:
In a safety-critical work environment, it is important to promote moderate levels of trust 
and an element of scepticism and healthy wariness. These attitudes should be promoted 
toward all groups, and in particular supervisors and leaders. To achieve this, programs 
might focus on improving beliefs and feelings about another’s trustworthiness (Conchie, 
Donald & Taylor, 2006: 1103).
The authors provide a moderate view stressing the potential of high levels 
of trust to reduce personal responsibilities for safety and create an over-
reliance on other people (see also Conchie & Donald, 2008). In line with this, 
a comparison of train-operating companies in the UK by Jeffcott et al. (2006) 
shows that rule-based trust at the operational level, understood as over-
reliance on formal procedures, can reduce alertness to lapses in the safety 
system. Other scholars who explicitly address the importance of creative 
mistrust (e.g. Hale, 2000) and distrust (e.g. Burns, Mearns & McGeorge, 
2006; Conchie & Donald, 2008) propose that trusting behavior might hinder 
workforces in challenging unsafe acts and lead to groupthink situations. 
Moreover, a consulting group of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
highlights the importance of a questioning attitude as one main individual 
contribution to a strong safety culture (INSAG-4, 1991), in other words, 
individuals question both their own behavior and safety responsibilities, and 
the behavior and responsibilities of others.
One can conclude from this that trusting behavior is not in general beneficial 
for safe performance in HROs. Instead the outcomes of trust have to be evalu-
ated with respect to the different situations and targets where either low or high 
levels of trust are appropriate. In the present article I address the concept of 
trust with regard to the specific work context of HROs. In line with recent 
literature, I claim that not only beneficial but also detrimental effects have to 
be considered in the analysis of trust in HROs. The key question is how trust 
supports highly reliable performance and, on the other hand, how and under 
what conditions trust leads to individual actors taking or running risks. The 
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focus is on trust within human interactions and trust within human–system 
interactions. I suggest that trust will contribute within both types of interac-
tions to highly reliable performance. However, beneficial effects differ with 
respect to the interactional context in which trust is conferred and, conse-
quently, with respect to the beliefs on which trust is based. To illustrate these 
assumptions, I focus on three distinct aspects moderating the effect of trust on 
safety-specific outcomes: beliefs based on shared values and norms, institution-
based beliefs and beliefs based on system reliability. Note that the article does 
not claim to provide a full review of previous trust-safety related research. 
Rather, it presents three distinct routes of trust, in order to illustrate how trust 
beliefs calibrate the impact of trust on safe and reliable performance.
In what follows I define the key terms used throughout this paper. I then 
explain why the effects of trusting behavior vary according to the type of 
interaction involved (human interactions vs. human–system interaction), 
and which particular aspects of the working context can interfere with a 
beneficial function of trust. Finally, I draw conclusions about the potential 
of trust for optimizing safety in HROs.
Conceptualizing trust in HROs
In line with recent conceptualizations of organizational trust (Mayer, Davis 
& Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998), trusting behavior is defined 
here as the behavioral manifestation of a trustor’s intention of becoming 
vulnerable. Besides the individual’s disposition or propensity to trust, a 
trusting intention is based on a positive expectation that a trustee is able and 
willing to act in line with the trustor’s interests.
In the following section, I address the potential foundations of trust 
involved in human interactions versus human–system interactions.
Trust in human interactions
Organizational research on trust has identified several antecedents that foster 
the emergence of interpersonal trust within organizations. In general, three 
aspects of trust are differentiated (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Sitkin, 
1995). An individual’s trust may be based on the trustee’s competence (ability 
or capability) to act as expected. Benevolence-based trust refers to the trustee’s 
concern and goodwill to do the best in order to fulfill action expectations. Trust 
can be further based on perceived value congruence between trustor and 
trustee. Sitkin (1995: 188) defines value-based trust as obtaining when ‘the 
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other party’s beliefs and values are perceived as being congruent with your 
own such that they will approach unforeseeable situations in a way that is 
consistent with the general thrust of one’s expectations’. All bases of trust have 
the potential to directly influence a trustor’s expectation and beliefs about the 
other’s trustworthiness and willingness to engage in trusting behavior.
In reviewing research on safety and trust, Conchie & Donald emphasize 
the importance of benevolence- and integrity/value-based trust for the 
development of shared safety values and attitudes. They contrast the safety-
specific function of competence-based trust against trust based on integrity 
and benevolence:
For example, trust in another’s technical competence creates a confidence that another 
person has the necessary training to complete a job safely. However, it does not indicate 
whether the person will carry out the job in a safe way, openly communicate about mistakes 
or engage in helping behaviors (Conchie & Donald, 2008: 101).
Hence both authors assume that relational forms of trust (benevolence- 
and integrity-based trust) have more positive effects on safety than its ratio-
nal form (competence-based trust).
Trust in human–system interactions
Whereas trust based on another party’s competence, benevolence and values 
forms trustworthiness beliefs directly related to another individual or group, 
a more abstract foundation of trust becomes relevant when humans interact 
with rules or systems: this is institution-based trust. Since HRO production 
processes are inherently hazardous, the stakes of faulty trust decisions are 
high. Consequently, HROs are particularly concerned with minimizing 
uncertainties or known risks by high levels of standardization (Grote, 2007). 
For instance, formal work procedures and hazard-warning systems or safe-
ty-management systems are designed to increase reliability. These rule-
based systems organize collective risk-monitoring and risk-coping activities 
in HROs to a large extent. When considering the safety-specific function of 
trust, it seems important to consider not only the trustor’s expectations about 
other people but also the expectations about the functioning of organiza-
tional safety systems (Jeffcott et al., 2006).
In general, institution- (or system-) based trust serves as a substitute for 
interpersonal trust (Zucker, 1986; Shapiro, 1987). It builds on the expecta-
tion that a system is functioning and that others also trust in that function 
(Luhmann, 1979). The risk of misplacing trust is lowered to a tolerable level 
by institutions (defined here simply as a set of rules), since they guide and 
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constrain organizational members’ way of trusting in others. Moreover, 
institutions or regulations have the potential to engender relational trust by 
increasing the degree of mutual understanding (Sitkin, 1995). In their model 
of initial trust formation, McKnight, Cummings & Chervany (1998: 478) 
define institution-based trust as the belief that proper impersonal structures are 
in place to enable the anticipation of a successful future endeavor. They pro-
pose that institution-based trust is a separate construct from beliefs about 
another party’s favorable attributes. However, institution-based trust has the 
potential to affect trusting beliefs and intention. This is mainly due to struc-
tural assurance beliefs (i.e. that proper contextual conditions such as promises, 
contracts, regulations are in place) as well as situational normality beliefs (i.e. 
that ‘things occur normally’). Both types of beliefs contribute to a trustor’s 
perception of situations as trustworthy or not (McKnight & Chervany, 2006).
Safety research has rarely focused on the effects of institution-based trust. 
As I said above, Jeffcott et al. (2006) refer to safety effects of extensive rule-
based trust. They assume that this type of trust involves the risk of reduced 
flexibility of organizational members when coping with unexpected risks. 
Here, especially those risks that are not covered by formal rules seem to be 
relevant (see also Conchie & Donald, 2008).
A related approach to trust in systems has been developed in the context of 
psychological automation research, which focuses on trust-relevant charac-
teristics of automated systems. Lee & See (2004) suggest that attributions of 
trustworthiness to an automated system stem from the direct observation of 
its ‘behavior’ (performance: reliability of the automation, or ‘what the auto-
mation does’), from the understanding of its underlying mechanisms (pro-
cess: algorithms and operations of the automation, or ‘how the automation 
operates’) and from its intended use (purpose: the goal to be achieved by 
automation design, or ‘why the automation was developed’). Lee & See state 
that these beliefs parallel dimensions of interpersonal bases of trust and con-
tribute to the development of functional or dysfunctional levels of safety-
specific trust in automated systems.
In sum I propose that effects of safety-specific trust are prone to contextual 
aspects of HRO work situations. Trusting beliefs (about a trustee’s compe-
tence, benevolence and values) as well as institution-based beliefs (about 
structural assurances and normality of a situation) are assumed to moderate 
a trustor’s intention to trust, i.e. to become vulnerable. In order to further 
specify the role of trust in safety performance, two general assumptions are 
made. First, beneficial effects of trust are identified when trust supports reli-
able performance of human actors in HROs. Second, detrimental effects are 
assumed when trusting behavior leads to unreliable performance. Both 
assumptions center on the notion of compensating for human and technical 
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failures. Whereas beneficial effects of trust involve compensating for others’ 
failures, detrimental effects result from non-compensation, such as when oth-
ers’ behavior is not checked or monitored (Conchie & Donald, 2008).
Three routes of safety-specific trust in HROs
Trust has the potential to influence reliable performance in HROs both posi-
tively and negatively. In this section, I address three selected mechanisms 
through which trust affects safe performance. First, the safety effects of trust 
within human interactions: in line with the theory of trust in safety settings, 
I argue that relational forms of interpersonal trust (based on shared values 
and norms) are crucial for increasing and decreasing reliable performance. 
Second, I discuss the safety-specific function of trust in human–system inter-
action where human actors interact within institutional contexts. The role of 
institution-based trust in promoting safety is explored. Third, I examine trust 
with regard to situations where the target of trust is not a human actor but 
rather the system itself, focusing on the calculative function of trust. Finally, 
I draw some conclusions concerning those organizational factors that have 
the power to make beneficial effects of trust on safety more likely to occur.
Safety-specific trust in human interactions
When considering the safety-specific function of trusting behavior in HROs, 
it is crucial to focus on the actual context in which the relationship between 
trustor and trustee is embedded. Trusting another person always includes a 
situational analysis, which allows determining the extent to which the other is 
trustworthy, that is, he will show the expected behavior in a given situation 
(Hardin, 1992). This predictive function of trust seems to be particularly rel-
evant when considering effects of trusting behavior in HROs. These systems 
have no choice but to function safely because failures might result in severe 
consequences. When individuals trust within risky settings, they have to adapt 
their trusting behavior to the potential risks implied in a current work context, 
in other words, they compare the level of risk (or how much may be lost in 
a given situation) to the level of trust, giving stronger weight to the latter. 
According to Mayer, Davis & Schoorman (1995), the level of risk inherent in 
interpersonal trusting behavior is twofold. On the one hand, it is determined 
by the relationship with the trustee, i.e. how that person’s ability, integrity and 
benevolence in terms of showing the expected behavior is perceived. On the 
other hand, it refers to risks lying outside this relationship.
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A study by Kleindienst & Schöbel (2005) shows how both characteristics 
influence a trust decision in a safety-critical situation, in this case, a surgical 
operation where human actors with different professional backgrounds have to 
collaborate. Using an online survey, the authors confronted 152 anesthesiolo-
gists from different German hospitals with the following decision problem:
Imagine you are working together with a surgeon. In the course of the operation you notice 
a loss of blood in the patient. There is no unit of cross-matched blood in the operating room, 
which would be necessary for an immediate transfusion. The surgeon says that he has every-
thing under control, which implies that he is able to stop the bleeding sufficiently.
The dilemma of the protagonist can be mapped onto the following deci-
sion: to trust the surgeon, or to order a unit of cross-matched blood instead. 
The results indicated that participants revealed significantly more trust (no 
order of a unit of cross-matched blood) with a young patient with better 
health status compared to an older, less stable patient. Moreover the partici-
pants showed a higher degree of trust when the trustee had a higher hierar-
chical position than themselves, compared to a condition where trustor and 
trustee had the same rank. These results demonstrate that the magnitude and 
the probability of relational and situational risks are of crucial importance 
for an actor’s trusting behavior in HROs.
When considering the safety-specific function of trust within this type of 
human interaction, two arguments can be made. The first rests on the assump-
tion that trust behavior is beneficial for safety in that it produces and is based 
on shared safety perceptions and attitudes (e.g. DePasquale & Geller, 1999; 
Watson, Bishop & Scott, 2005; Conchie & Donald, 2008). In line with this 
assumption, I propose that value-based trust has the potential to positively 
influence safety. Trust promotes safety on a group level in that it allows for 
collaboration between the trustor and the trustee (Mishra, 1996). Since anesthe-
siologists and surgeons have different professional backgrounds, their overlap-
ping knowledge and perspectives on the same situation merge through ongoing 
trusting behavior, which is a necessary requirement in the face of the uncer-
tainty of the situation. Weick & Roberts (1993) conceptualize such highly 
reliable team performances as the result of ‘heedful’ interaction between indi-
viduals, their shared knowledge and task responsibilities. Moreover, value-
based trust allows for safety-promoting collaboration by broadening the 
behavioral repertoire of a trustor. For instance, it includes the option to trust and 
to compensate (to order a unit of cross-matched blood) when the trustee’s per-
formance is assumed not to be reliable. In that sense, the anesthesiologist can 
feel safe in receiving criticism, or speaking up if he expects a negative outcome 
from the behavior of the surgeon. This intrapsychic state parallels the concept 
of psychological safety (Edmondson, 1999). This concept describes individu-
als’ perceptions in teams about the consequences of interpersonal risks (e.g. 
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being seen by others as ignorant, incompetent or disruptive), when they seek 
feedback or help, give advice or discuss errors. According to Edmondson 
(2003), trust has positive effects on psychological safety since trusting indi-
viduals are likely to believe they will benefit from the doubt about others’ 
safety behavior.
On the other hand, trust may have detrimental effects when trust decisions 
are not balanced with situational demands, in other words when unreliable 
performance (e.g. a human or technical failure) is not compensated by trust. 
For instance, Foushee (1982) illustrates dysfunctional types of hierarchy-
driven interactions in multipiloted aircraft cockpits. He refers to influences 
on trust that do not build on shared safety values alone but also operate on 
a group level. In his analysis he stresses that subordinate crewmembers can 
become ‘conditioned’ not to speak up (and to trust in the competence of their 
hierarchically higher-ranked captain), referring to the following report 
where a co-pilot sums up the causes of a near-miss:
The captain said he had misread his altimeter and thought he was 1000 ft. lower than he 
was. I believe the main factor involved here was my reluctance to correct the captain. This 
captain is very ‘approachable’ and I had no real reason to hold back. It’s just a bad habit 
that I think a lot of copilots have of double-checking everything before we say anything to 
the captain. (Foushee, 1982: 1063)
As Foushee illustrates, cultural norms constrain trust-building and knowledge-
sharing by human actors in high-reliability settings. Categorizing others in 
terms of their role, responsibility or expertise may lead to dysfunctional 
types of trust. For instance, when the trustor holds back important informa-
tion in favor of information provided by the more powerful trustee.
It becomes evident that both beneficial and detrimental effects of trust on 
safety may result from group-level processes. The safety impact of trust is 
calibrated by shared values and rests on experiential group-specific knowl-
edge gained in direct human interactions.
The next section discusses influences of trust on safety due to institution- 
and system-based beliefs inherent in human–system interactions.
Safety-specific trust in human–system interaction
HROs are conceived of as interactively complex and tight-coupled systems 
(Perrow, 1984). This allows greater functionality and efficiency, but produces 
unfamiliar and unexpected sequences of events, which are neither visible nor 
immediately comprehensible. In addition, single-component failures have the 
potential to rapidly affect several parts of the whole system simultaneously. 
Thus, operators in HROs are constantly required to monitor system performance 
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accurately, detect dysfunctional processes and, if necessary, initiate corrective 
actions. In HROs, monitoring of potential process deviations is formally orga-
nized by rules and systems, especially in those organizations that have a high 
hazard potential (e.g. nuclear power plants). Monitoring rules and systems are 
used to obtain real-time as well as periodical information on safety-critical pro-
cesses and system states.
In order to discuss safety-specific trust within human–system interac-
tions, I differentiate between redundant monitoring systems and automated 
systems. The two differ with respect to the main target of trust (trust in 
humans within institutional contexts vs. trust in the system itself).
Trust within redundant monitoring systems
In HROs with high levels of standardized risk control, the pooling of indi-
viduals’ information-processing and distribution is organized primarily 
through bureaucratic systems based on the redundancy principle. The impact 
of individual failures (e.g. misinterpreting safety-relevant information or not 
checking system states) on system reliability is meant to be minimized by 
structuring collective risk monitoring in line, i.e. in sequence. For instance, 
in the context of risk-monitoring systems in nuclear industries, individuals 
receive information about co-workers’ decisions and behavior in written and 
condensed form (via monitoring sheets, shift books, IT systems or safety 
reports). In this case to trust means to rely on others’ past behavior as a 
source of valid information about a current system state.
Beneficial effects of trust can be directly linked to the concept of institution-
based trust. High levels of institution-based trust allow the trustor not to be 
concerned about a trustee’s benevolence and integrity, since these systems 
substitute for relational aspects of trust. Contrary to pure human interactions 
where compensating for others’ failures is up to the trustor’s beliefs about 
others’ benevolence and values, here the system structurally assures com-
pensatory behavior and therefore reduces interpersonal risks of misplaced 
trust because less is at stake (Sitkin, 1995).
However, high levels of institution-based trust may also have detrimental 
effects on safety. Two lines of explanation appear to be relevant here. First, 
in HROs safety is not visible to human actors, in other words safety is taken 
for granted when there is no deviance from expected system performance. A 
co-worker who does nothing but his regular work performance turns out to 
be a safety-relevant cue for a trustor. For instance, a co-worker confirms the 
installation of a new component in the IT system. High levels of institution-
based trust may foster the assumption that the other has already checked the 
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component and did not detect an unsafe state. This assumption will be more 
likely the stronger the situational normality beliefs are in place. However, 
relying on the ‘unsuspicious’ behavior of others may be based on a faulty 
assessment. According to the phenomenon of social shirking (Sagan, 2004), 
individuals tend to shirk unpleasant duties because they tend to assume that 
someone else will naturally take care of the problem. The result is a diffu-
sion of responsibility, stemming from a particular type of institution-based 
trust, that is, a belief in the regularity of others’ work activities.
Second, trust in information that has been directly inferred from others’ 
behavior within institutional contexts may lead to reliability losses. Imagine 
a nuclear power-plant operator assigned to monitor deviations from defined 
parameters. He obtains critical information signaling an unsafe system state. 
But this information is only probabilistically related to the true system state. 
As the operator knows, his diagnosis will be correct with a certain probability 
only. Looking at the monitoring sheet, he notices that his supervisor and 
his colleague have recently diagnosed a safe system state. What should 
the operator do? Should he rely on his own actual signal or instead trust in 
the information provided by his supervisors and colleagues? In reality the 
operator has to base his trust decision on incomplete information; he has to 
speculate about what kind of information the supervisor and his colleague, 
respectively, have based their diagnosis on. Specifically he has to consider 
that both predecessors may have relied on different information and that his 
colleague may have behaved in conformity with the hierarchical superior 
and/or more-knowledgeable supervisor. However, even when the supervisor 
and colleague have decided according to their own signal (i.e. signaling a 
safe system state), it is still possible that all of the actors (including the trus-
tor) are wrong. As the theory of information cascades (Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer & Welsh, 1992; Anderson & Holt 1997) holds, initially misrep-
resentative information may start chains of incorrect decisions which are not 
going to be interrupted by more representative information gained later. By 
means of Bayesian modeling of sequential decision-making processes, 
Schöbel & Rieskamp (under review) were able to show that both normative 
influences (through hierarchical effects) and informational influences 
(through expertise) can enhance the decision weight of trusted social infor-
mation, which leads to a higher probability of faulty decision-making pat-
terns. Given all these pitfalls, the crucial point is that a decision to trust 
within an institutional context always implies uncertainty about the trusting 
behavior of others. Although redundant control systems have the potential 
to minimize uncertainties and to substitute for and support interpersonal 
trust, they can allow and sometimes even foster uncertainties, in particular 
when hidden social influences lead the trustor to underestimate potential 
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uncertainty in the trustee’s action. As a consequence, collective risk-monitoring 
performance may decrease due to redundant communication structures that 
involve a high level of institution-based trust.
Trust in automated systems
In the area of human interaction with automated systems, the notion of trust is 
of prime importance. While collaborative interactions involve continuous and 
mutually adaptive processes between human actors, trust in automated sys-
tems is primarily a one-sided affair: the target of trust is the system and no 
direct reciprocity between trustor and the trustee is to be expected. Therefore 
beneficial and detrimental effects of trust on safety rest mainly on its calcula-
tive function: the perceived reliability of an automated system. Trust can be 
understood here as an attitude which influences the quality and outcomes of 
man–machine interaction (Lee & See, 2004). From a normative point of view, 
the degree of trust in automation should correspond with performance features 
of the automated system: its reliability, transparency and usability. Mismatches 
between trust in the system and actual system performance result in inappro-
priate human monitoring and information-sampling behavior.
According to Manzey & Bahner (2005), two kinds of mismatches (i.e. det-
rimental effects on safety) can be identified. On the one hand, individuals tend 
uncritically to count on the reliability of automated systems and neglect to 
monitor and check system performance. This phenomenon is called compla-
cency. On a motivational level, complacency reflects a relatively low level of 
suspicion toward system performance (Wiener, 1981). Consequences of com-
placency may include a loss of situational awareness (Endsley, 1995) and the 
risk that human actors fail to detect and manage automation failures in due time 
(Bahner & Manzey, 2008). On the other hand, individuals may in general show 
only low trust in automated systems, in other words, have a general tendency 
to undervalue the benefits of automation and instead rely on their own skills 
and competencies. This behavior can have severe consequences, particularly 
where automated warning and alarm systems are concerned. For instance, 
Parasuraman, Hancock & Olofinboba (1997) showed that the degree of trust in 
automated systems is moderated by the threshold level of alarm systems and 
the base-rate frequency of unsafe system states. Both variables refer to the reli-
ability of a system and affect the perceived trustworthiness of alarm systems.
Notably, interpersonal trust can be further assumed to affect the prioritiza-
tion of alarms and warnings from automated systems in HROs. This appears 
to be especially the case when there is low trust in the performance reliabil-
ity of an automated system. Empirical evidence for this assumption comes 
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from a field study conducted in an Eastern European nuclear power plant 
by Ignatov, Wilpert & Schöbel (2001). By means of group discussions and 
qualitative interviews with plant personnel, the authors were able to derive 
systematic descriptions of safety-critical work situations in which compli-
ance with safety rules was in question. These situations were then applied in 
a questionnaire in order to measure the relative importance of individual 
attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control in the prediction 
of compliance with safety rules (according to the theory of planned behav-
ior: Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Ajzen, 1991). One situation describes the han-
dling of a potential false alarm:
Seismic measurement channel No. 2 of one of the emergency reactor protection sets, 
located in the containment, generates a warning signal. The inspection of other seismic 
measurement channels does not show signs of real seismic hazard. Measurement channel 
No. 2 periodically (approximately every 30 minutes) generates warning signals and auto-
matically switches off in 10 seconds. According to the procedures, you are obliged 
to perform a renewed inspection in order to make sure once again that the system is func-
tioning properly.
The results of the study showed that both subjective norm and individual 
attitude are significant predictors of the behavioral intention to omit a 
renewed inspection. Interestingly, multiple regression analyses revealed that 
subjective norm makes a significantly greater contribution to the prediction 
of intention than individual attitude. The findings show that interpersonal 
trust may interfere with the interpretation of dynamic hazard warnings in 
HROs in situations where two distinct informational sources (i.e. warning 
signals vs. perceived other persons’ behavior) conflict. Further evidence for 
this notion comes from the analysis of the mid-air collision of a Tupolev 
154m and a Boeing 757 cargo aircraft in Germany in 2002 (Bennet, 2004). 
At the time of collision, these aircrafts were directed by the Swiss Air Traffic 
Control (ATC). Both airplanes were equipped with an on-board anti-collision 
device known as Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System Version 2 
(TCAS II). If TCAS II senses that two aircrafts are on a collision course, it 
sends reciprocal instructions to both of the crews. Instruction effectiveness 
depends on both crews obeying the instructions or not. While the Boeing 
757 crew obeyed the TCAS instruction, the Tupolev crew decided to follow 
the – contradictory – instruction of a human air-traffic controller, and there-
fore flew into the path of the Boeing aircraft. The analysis of the collision 
identified several important factors that contributed to the crew’s decision 
not to trust TCAS II, for instance cultural and procedural factors concerning 
the introduction of TCAS II in the EU and Russia. Bennet’s analysis further 
shows that conflict between trust in others and trust in automated systems 
may lead to dramatic consequences.
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In sum, it becomes evident that trusting behavior in HROs is also manifested 
in human–machine interaction. The beneficial effects of trust are shown to 
depend on the correspondence between the degree of trust and the performance 
characteristics of automated systems. Trust mediates human actors’ alertness in 
order to compensate for technical hazards. However, due to the opacity of 
automated systems, trust mismatches may occur which undermine the benefits 
of automation. In contrast to interpersonal trust, where trustor and trustee are to 
a certain degree aware of each other’s intentions and behavior, such symmetry 
does not apply to man–machine interactions (Lee & See, 2004). Contrasting 
the available information about the trustworthiness of a human with that of a 
technical trustee, it seems to be more plausible to trust the human actor than the 
technical actor due to attributional variance and associated uncertainties inher-
ent in automated systems.
Conclusion
The article has tried to specify relevant facets of trust that are manifested in 
human interactions and human–system interactions in HROs. It highlights 
the idea that beneficial and detrimental effects of trust on safety perfor-
mance vary according to the context in which trust is conferred. In general, 
trust emerges as a crucial component of safety performance in HROs. 
Accordingly three potential routes are explored through which trust affects 
safety performance in HRO settings.
First, when human actors interact, both beneficial and detrimental effects 
of trust can be attributed to group-level processes based on shared values and 
norms. The potential of value-based trust is to foster collaboration between 
‘psychologically safe’ actors. In contrast, detrimental effects may result when 
trust relations are socially forced by values that undermine safety. It thus 
becomes evident that shared values are important safety calibrators of trust-
ing behavior in HROs. This assumption is based on models of safety culture 
that highlight the importance of trust within an effective safety culture (e.g. 
Reason, 1998; Cox, Jones & Collinson, 2006). For instance, Watson, Bishop 
& Scott (2005) showed that shared employee norms as well as trust in super-
visors and beliefs in management safety values are important predictors of 
workplace safety. The authors assume that these predictors constitute the 
relational dimension of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet & Goshal, 
1998) necessary to promote workplace safety.
The fact that safety-promoting collaboration is facilitated by trust is also 
reflected in the concept of requisite variety (Ashby, 1958; Weick, 1987). 
Based on the assumption that humans are not as complex as the systems they 
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have to manage, Weick (1987) argued that ‘when people have less variety 
than is requisite to cope with the system, they miss important information, 
their diagnoses are incomplete, and their remedies are short-sighted and can 
magnify rather than reduce a problem’ (p. 112). In order to overcome the 
mismatch between (less complex) individuals and (highly complex) sys-
tems, he suggests pooling differing individual observations on system states 
by means of social interactions and networks. According to Weick, trust has 
the power to enhance collective requisite variety because it enlarges the pool 
of informational input.
As a second important aspect of safety-specific trust, institution-based 
trust is considered. On the one hand, institutional contexts support interper-
sonal trust by reducing interpersonal risks, especially those that become 
salient when failures of other human actors are detected. Formalized moni-
toring systems based on the redundancy principle allow for compensating 
for others’ failures since they structurally assure that it is appropriate to 
compensate for human and technical failures. On the other hand, institution-
based beliefs have the potential to bias trust beliefs about others’ past behav-
ior. Specifically, risk-monitoring systems can provide only incomplete 
information about the other’s trustworthiness. Strong beliefs in the normal-
ity (i.e. safety) of a trusting situation may lead to misinterpretations of 
behavior, for instance, trusting a co-worker’s signature as evidence of per-
formed checks without knowing whether the check was really performed. 
Overt behavior and inferred judgments of co-workers become relevant 
informational cues, which are taken as highly trustworthy, irrespective of 
potential uncertainties involved in the behavior of the trustee. In addition, 
informational as well normative social influences are hidden by bureau-
cratically organized risk-monitoring systems. These risks should be espe-
cially likely to occur in ultra-safe systems like nuclear power or chemical 
plants, where major accidents are rare events (Amalberti, 2002).
When considering the safety specifics of institution-based trust, it is 
important to note that the organizational members’ beliefs about the function 
of a safety system should also correspond with their shared values in order 
to guarantee the system’s expected benefits. For instance, the success of 
reporting systems in HROs crucially depends on how blame and punishment 
are handled (e.g. Reason, 1998; Cox, Jones & Collinson, 2006). Perceived 
unfairness, lack of commitment on the part of top management or assigning 
blame to the system user are system outcomes that may counteract the 
intended function of a system and, therefore, lower structural assurance 
beliefs. Sitkin (1995) proposed that regulations can undermine the opportu-
nity to gain trust-related benefits by goal-displacement, that is to say ‘view-
ing legalistic procedures as the end rather than a means to fostering high 
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levels of relational trust’ (p. 207). It becomes evident that beneficial effects 
of trust in institutional HRO contexts are prone to the shared values of orga-
nizational members, irrespective of their inherent trust-relevant characteris-
tics. In contrast to other types of organizations, HROs have the difficult task 
of aligning and balancing two sets of member values: values supporting 
efficient production processes and values supporting safety, which some-
times are at stake with production concerns. Therefore the promotion of 
beneficial trust in HROs presupposes carefully disentangling both aspects 
when dealing with human interactions and human–system interactions.
Last but not least, safety-specific trust refers to human interactions with 
automated systems. Beneficial and detrimental effects of trust rest mainly on 
the trustor’s capability to accurately assess the reliability of an automated system. 
Due to the opaque properties of technical actors, individuals can be expected 
to show optimal trust in automated systems as long as the functioning of these 
systems corresponds to the mental models of their users. In line with this, a new 
generation of automated systems has been recently claimed, to which the role 
of a ‘team-partner’ is assigned such that human actors can interact with them 
in a collaborative way (e.g. Christoffersen & Woods, 2002).
All in all, trust emerges as a most valuable and still highly underrated 
concept for the optimization of safety performance in HROs. More specifi-
cally it becomes evident that we should abstain from conceiving of trust as 
a general, context-independent remedy. Instead the full benefits of trusting 
behavior can be gained only if HROs manage to develop and maintain work 
settings that favor the beneficial aspects of trust, including collaboration and 
knowledge-sharing between human actors in HROs.
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